Question Five. Whether the Created Will is the Total and Immediate Cause with Respect to its Willing, such that God does not Have, with Respect to that Willing, any Immediate Efficient Causality but only a Mediate One

96. Because this solution, however, and the solution to the fourth question (namely whether God is the cause of sin [n.20]) depend on knowledge of the activity of a created will with respect to its own act, therefore I ask (without arguments) whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, such that God does not have, with respect to that willing, any immediate efficient causality but only a mediate one.

α. Opinion of Others

97. To this question one could say [Peter OliviSumma IIa q.116: “Some say that the essence of all actions, both natural and vicious, are as immediately from God as are the essences that he creates... But others say that the actions of created agents, at least those that are bad, are not at all immediately from God, because he does not make them except by the fact he makes and holds and conserves in being all active and passive causes, or all causes cooperating and concurring in any way to the production of such actions. Because therefore this second way seems to me it should be altogether held, for I do not see that God could otherwise appear altogether guiltless in the case of our guilt and vices, for this reason - without prejudice to any better opinion - I will subjoin the things that seem capable of being adduced for this side. That therefore the aforesaid actions are from God not in the first way but in the second is proved thus: first, that they are totally and immediately from second causes; second, that they are from free will; third, that they are vicious; fourth, that they are culpable, or that the agent or recipient is guilty because of them.” ⁴⁶ and others] that the will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its own volition.

98. [Proof by reason] - This is proved by reason:

First, because otherwise the will would not be free; second, because otherwise it could cause nothing contingently; third, because otherwise it could not sin; fourth, because otherwise it could have altogether no action; fifth, from comparison of it with other created causes.

99. In the first way [n.98] the proof is twofold:

First as follows: no power has perfectly in its control [power] an effect that cannot be caused by it immediately or that cannot be caused by any cause whose causation is not in the control of that power; but the causation of God is not in the control of a created will (as is plain), just as the virtue of a higher agent is not in the control of any lower agent; therefore if God is necessarily immediately concurrent - as immediate cause - in respect of a created volition, the created will does not have the volition fully in its control. The assumed major premise is plain, because what has an effect perfectly in its control either has from itself alone power over the effect, or the causation of any concurring cause is in its control, namely as to the causing or not causing by that concurring cause; there is an example about the intellect which, if it concurs in causing a volition (according to the third opinion in 2 d.25 [not in the Ordinatio but the Lectura, where it is Scotus’ own opinion]), yet does not cause it save with the will’s causing, so that the intellect’s causing is in the power of the will.

100. The second argument according to this way is as follows: what is determined to something by another does not have that something perfectly in its control; the created will is determined to this something - ex hypothesi - by the divine will;     therefore etc     .

The proof of the minor is that either one of the wills determines the other or vice versa (and our will does not determine the divine will, because the temporal is not the cause of the eternal), or neither will determines the other, and then neither of them will be a moved mover, and there would be no essential order between them; rather, if the divine will does not determine our will (as the second reason argues [n.101]), the divine will could will something that, because of the disagreement of our will, would not come about.

101. Further, from the second way [n.98] the argument is as follows: a thing is not contingent because of its relation to some cause if a higher cause is determined to the thing’s coming about, and if the determination of this higher cause is necessarily followed by the determination of all the lower causes. An example: if my will were now determined to the affirmative option about writing tomorrow, and if my will were not subject to impediment or change, then my writing tomorrow would not be contingent (now, however, it is contingent to either option because of its relation to my hand), for as the will is determined now to one option, so there are contained virtually in it all the lower causes for the same effect, and simply so (because, if a thing by whose determination the effect would be determined is determined, the happening of the effect is not simply indeterminate as to either side - at any rate its existence is not contingent because of the power of a lower cause). But if the divine will is the immediate cause of my willing, there is now some cause determinate with respect to my willing, because God’s will is eternally determined to one of the contradictories, and the determination of this divine cause is necessarily followed by the determination of my will with respect to the same willing (otherwise ‘God willing this’ and ‘this not going to happen’ would stand together); therefore this willing is not contingent to either side because of the power of my will.

102. From the third way [n.98] the argument is as follows: if God is the immediate cause of volition, it is clear he will be a cause prior to the will; therefore he will have an influence on the effect prior in nature to my will. I take then this moment of nature wherein God causes a willing, insofar as it is prior to the moment in which the will acts for the willing; either God in that moment immediately causes perfect rightness in the willing, and consequently in the second moment the will does not sin, because it does not cause in the effect the opposite of what the first cause causes; or in that first moment God does not cause rightness in the willing, and then it follows that in the second moment the will does not sin, because it then has no power to will rightly (for in the second moment it only has power for what the prior cause produces in the first moment); but the will does not sin by not having a right willing if it cannot have a right willing;     therefore etc     .

103. From the fourth way [n.98] the argument is: if God is the cause of the volition, he will be the total cause of it, because he will cause it by willing it (but he is, by his willing, the total cause of a more perfect creature, namely an angel, or of anything created from nothing; and if he was the cause of it by willing it, he would be the total cause of it); but nothing else along with the total cause of something can, in any genus of cause, co-cause that something along with it; so the will would have no causality with respect to its own volition.

104. From the fifth way [n.98] the argument is: if any [creature] is the total active cause with respect to its effect, this must be conceded most of all about the will, because the will is supreme among active causes; but some [creature] can be the total cause with respect to its effect.

105. I prove [the minor] in two ways:

First, because this [sc. being total active cause] is not repugnant to creatures. For though there is something that is the total efficient cause of heat, this does not posit in that something any infinity or perfection repugnant to a creature; for if the thing is a univocal cause, it need not excel the effect in perfection, and if it is an equivocal cause, it need not excel the effect infinitely but in some determinate degree.

106. There is a second proof of the minor, for that thing is total cause of something which, if it existed while everything else was per impossibile removed, would perfectly cause the effect; but a subject, if it existed while everything else was removed, would cause its proper accident; therefore the subject is the total cause with respect to its proper accident.

107. From this minor, proved in two ways [nn.105, 106], the conclusion is drawn that the will can be the total cause with respect to its volition; and further, since nothing else beside the total cause causes in the same genus of cause (otherwise the same thing would be caused twice, or would be caused by something without which it would not be able not to be), then God will not immediately cause this volition.

108. [Proof from authorities] The intended conclusion [n.97] is proved by authorities:

First from Ecclesiasticus 15.14-18, where it is said that God “made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. And gave him his commandments and precepts: ‘If you wish to keep the commandments, they will keep you’. For he has put before you fire and water; stretch out your hand to what you want. In front of man is good and bad, life and death; what has pleased him will be given him.”

109. Augustine too, City of God 7.30, says, “God so administers the things he has made that he permits them to make their own motions.”

110. Anselm too, On Concord 1.7, “God has made all actions and all movements, because he himself made the things by which and in which and from which they come to be; and no thing has any power of willing or doing but he himself gives it.”

111. The same again, 2.3, “God does not do the things he predestines, by compelling or resisting the will, but by giving power to its being.”

112. To this effect also is the Commentator [Averroes] Metaphysics 9 com.7 (on the remark, “So it is possible for something to have power”): “The moderns posit that one agent, namely God, causes all things without intermediary. And it happens that no being has naturally its own action; and since beings do not have their own actions, they will not have their own essences (for actions are not distinguished save by diverse essences). And this opinion is very far from the nature of man, etc.” a

a. a[Interpolation] These two reasons [from Averroes] seem to make the opinion [n.97] more compelling than those that are put for the opinion [nn.98-107].

β. The Response to the Fourth Question that Falls out from the Aforesaid Opinion of Others

113. If this way [n.97] were true, one could easily assign in accord with it how God is not the cause of sin [n.20]; for, whether speaking about the material or the formal element in sin, the whole would be from the created will as from the total cause, and so would in no way be from God save mediately, because God produced the will such that it could will in this way or in that.

γ. Instances against the Opinion of Others and Solutions to them

114. But it is objected against this way [n.97] that it would not save God’s being the cause of merit, since merit is as free as sin.

115. Likewise, it would not save the essential order of causes, because, according to the first proposition in On Causes, “Every primary cause has a greater influence on what it causes than does a second universal cause;” but, according to this way, the primary cause would have no influence on the effect save that it produced the other cause of it [sc. the will as cause of the willing this way or that, n.113].

116. To the first of these [n.114] it can be said that God is in some way cause of merit (in a way that he is not cause of sin), because he causes grace (or charity) immediately in the soul, which inclines it by way of nature toward meriting; and whenever a form active by way of nature is from some agent, the action of the form is also from that agent. From this too would be plain how the effects of certain causes would be from God differently from how the effects of the will are, because those determinate causes have received from God an inclination - even a necessitating inclination - to their effects; not so the will.

117. To the second [n.115] it might be said that, although sometimes the order of principal and less principal causes, neither of which moves the other (the way the object and the cognitive power are disposed with respect to the act of knowing, 1 d.3 n.498) -that although this order is such that the principal cause moves the less principal one either to second act or to first act (but so that the two are partial causes and make together with each other one total cause, as hand and stick do with respect to the motion of a ball [1 d.3 n.496], or as sun and father do with respect to a son) - nevertheless, in the case of causes that are total with respect to their immediate effects, there can also be an essential order, such that the second cause is total and immediate with respect to its effect just as the first cause is with respect to its own effect; and although the second cause is second and depends essentially on the first as regards its causation just as also regards its being, yet not in such a way that there is some immediate dependence of its effect on it and on a prior cause.

118. And when the proposition [from On Causes, n.115] says that “the first cause causes more” - this is true, because the first causes the second. An example of this can be posited in the case of essentially ordered causes, by the different way of causing; for if several material elements are posited in order in a composite thing with respect to the ultimate form, the first material element is not material with respect to the ultimate form (such that any part of it is perfected by the ultimate form), but only the ultimate material element is; for every prior material element is perfected by some prior form, which constitutes it as material with respect to a later form.

δ. Rejection of the Opinion

119. Against this opinion [n.97] the argument is twofold: first, because therefrom it follows that God does not naturally foreknow the future; second, that he is not omnipotent.

120. The proof of the first consequence is that God only has knowledge of future contingents if he knows with certitude the determination of his will with respect to things for which he has an immutable and irresistible will; but if the created will is the total cause with respect to its willing, and it is contingently disposed to its willing, then, however much the divine will is posited to be determinate as to one side of the things that depend on the created will, the created will is going to be able to will differently, and thus no certitude follows from knowledge of the determination of the divine will.

121. The proof of the second consequence [n.119] is threefold:

First, because everything that an omnipotent being wills happens; but if God wills my volition to be, and this is in the power of my will as a cause contingently disposed toward it, then my will can, of itself, be determined indifferently to one side or the other, and so that to which the divine will has determined my will is able not to come about.

122. Second, because, if my will is determined of itself to one side, the divine will cannot impede it without violating it (for, from the fact my will is determined to one side, it cannot be impeded unless it is violated); but violation of the will involves a contradiction; therefore God cannot impede my will.

123. Third, because an omnipotent will produces the willed thing into existence for the time when that will wants it to exist (for there is no other act of the divine will with respect to an angel or any other creature by which such creature is produced into existence); but if my will is the total cause of this volition, the divine will in no way produces that volition into existence.a

a. a[Interpolation] Note that the force of these arguments [nn.119-123] rests on three propositions, a, b, c - a: the fact of the action of the first cause being required for the causing of the second cause takes away freedom from the second cause; b: the fact of the determination of the first cause being followed also by the second in its acting takes away contingency from the action of the second cause. Again, on behalf of a: the cited fact takes away freedom most of all if the first cause determines the second; again, on behalf of b: the fact that the action of the first cause naturally precedes the action of the second takes away sin too from the second cause. The other proposition, c - which stands opposed to the reasons [nn.98-107] and the authorities [nn.108-112] - is that God is omnipotent and omniscient.

3. How Sin is from the Created Will

124. Rejecting this way [n.97], then, because of the two arguments about the omnipotence and omniscience of God [n.119], it remains to ask how sin can be from the created will, as to the first question [n.1], and how not be from God, as to the fourth question [n.20].

125. As to the first, I say that from the three ways (namely the two that posit a per accidens cause with respect to evil, and the third that posits a defective cause with respect to it [nn.77-78, 87]) a single integrated solution can be collected of the following sort:

In the case of sin there come together a positive act as the material element and a privation of due justice as the formal element. There is no efficient cause with respect to this privation but only a deficient cause, according to the third way [n.87]; for the will, which is duty bound to give rightness to its act and does not give it, sins by being deficient. But this ‘being deficient’ (namely not causing or not giving to its act the rightness that is due) is from a cause that could then freely cause it, namely freely give rightness to its act. This then is what it is to sin formally, that such a free cause does not give the due rightness that it could then give.

126. Hereby the [second] way about the per accidens cause [n.78] is evident. Although this cause does not cause what is formally in sin by effecting something but by failing to effect something, yet it does cause it by effecting something positive to which is annexed the deficiency caused by its failure, and on this point stand the authorities from Dionysius [n.78] about accidentality on the part of the effect.

127. There is also accidentality on the part of the cause not properly (properly is when the white is said to be a cause accidentally of understanding, and generally when something is properly an accident of a per se cause such that the cause makes a per accidens unity along with it [n.76]), but by extending the term ‘accident’ to anything that is outside the idea of something, in the way that the difference is said to be an accident of the genus. For, in this way, that by which our will is specifically ‘this will’ is an accident of ‘will in general’, because ‘will in general’ is a perfection simply (which is why it is posited formally in God), and will in this sense is not the proximate cause, even contingently, with respect to sin, because then any lower instance under it would have such a sense of causality, and the divine will would also. But will when it is through some difference contracted to created will (which we describe loosely by saying it is ‘limited’) is the proximate defective and per accidens cause with respect to sin; and so on the part of the cause too, when will in general is taken for the cause to which this difference is understood to be added, this accidentally happens to it per accidens, as if one were to say that animal is not per se but per accidens the cause of understanding because ‘the most perfect animal’ understands; indeed ‘most perfect’ is not the proper idea of understanding what is an accident of animal simply, but ‘rational’ is, because rational is an accident of animal as the difference is of the genus - for we indicate ‘rational’ loosely by saying ‘most perfect’.

128. So it is in the issue at hand. The specific difference, by which ‘will in general’ is contracted to created will (which contraction or difference is now hidden from us), we refer to loosely by the terms ‘limited or defectible being’ or by ‘from nothing’, and to this whole is attributed the act of volition in respect of sin as to a more proper cause than to will of itself; and this is true if it is understand of this substrate, namely of this specific will; and being the cause of sin belongs to this will not only per accidens (as it does to will in general), but also as to proximate cause, so that it can belong to any such will and to no other. And in this way should be understood the first opinion about the defectibility of the will [n.77].

B. To the Fourth Question

129. But now it remains to see how a defectible will is a deficient cause with respect to sin otherwise than the divine will is, or rather that it is the cause and the divine will is not the cause - and this as to the solution of the fourth question [n.20].

1. The Opinion of Others

130. Here it is said and held [Lombard 2 d.37 ch.2 n.4, and references] that the divine will cannot be the cause of sin.

131. For which three reasons of theirs can be set down.

The first is of the following sort - Augustine 83 Questions q.3, “A man becomes worse without any wise man being responsible; for this guilt in a man is so great that in no wise man may it happen; but God is more excelling than a wise man;” therefore a man becomes worse without God being responsible, as Augustine maintains in q.4.

132. Again in the same book q.21 Augustine says, “One who is for every being the cause that it exists, is not cause of not-being for anything to make it not exist, because what comes from him is, insofar as it is, good. Now God is cause of all good; God therefore is not cause of not-being for anything; therefore neither is he cause of sin for anything, because sin is formally not-being.”

133. The third reason is from Anselm On Free Choice ch.8, “Teacher: ‘[God] can reduce to nothing all the substance he has made from nothing - but he cannot separate rightness from a will that has rightness... Now no will is just save one that wills what God wills it to will. Therefore to keep rightness of will for the sake of rightness itself is - for anyone who keeps it - to will what God wills him to will. If God separates this rightness from anyone’s will, he does it either willingly or unwillingly.’ Student: ‘He cannot do it unwillingly.’ Teacher: ‘So if he takes the aforesaid rightness away from anyone’s will, he wills what he does.’ Student: ‘Without doubt he wills.’ Teacher: ‘Certainly, then, whosever will he wills to remove the same rightness from, he does not will him to keep rightness for the sake of rightness.’ Student: ‘It so follows.’ Teacher: ‘But it was already set down that to keep rightness of will in this way is - for anyone who keeps it - to will what God wills him to will. Therefore if God takes the oft stated rightness away from anyone, he does not will him to will what he wills him to will.’

Student: ‘Nothing is more logical, and nothing is more impossible.’ Teacher: ‘Therefore nothing is more impossible than for God to take away rightness of will.’”

2. Objections to the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

134. Objections to these reasons [nn.131-33]:

First against the first [n.131], because a wise man is bound to keep the precept of God, and therefore a wise man cannot make another to be worse unless he sins and so becomes non-wise. For it is not in a wise man’s power freely to cooperate or not cooperate in another’s acting well; because if it was in his power, he would be able not to cooperate while remaining wise, and thus he could make another to be worse - that is, by his not causing goodness in the other’s act, the other would not act well. But it is in God’s power freely to cooperate or not cooperate in a created will’s acting well; therefore, with his will remaining right, God is able not to cooperate with a created will, and the created will thus will commit sin.

135. The reason is confirmed by the fact that, just as God naturally acts for the right action before the created will does (provided the action be right), so the divine will, it would seem, fails to act before the created will fails to act.

136. The argument against the second reason [n.132] is as follows, that a cause that is only necessary (or natural) with respect to some entity is not a cause of not-being, because such a cause acts according to the utmost of its power, and so it cannot not do what it is of a nature to do; but God is not this sort of cause of being for creatures as regard any being with respect to which he can be the principle of acting (where the lack of this ultimate being is evil); therefore God can, by failing to act, be the cause of evil.

137. Further, how can God be more the cause of punishment than of guilt, since punishment, just like guilt, is formally evil? For it is as simply evil not to enjoy God -both with respect to the good that it takes away and with respect to the nature that it harms - as it is not to love God, while a wayfarer, by a meritorious act; and yet this is conceded to be a punishment from God, according to Augustine Retractions 1.25.

138. Further, the privation of grace is as much an evil in itself and in the nature that is deprived as is the privation of the rightness of justice; but God can be the immediate cause of this privation; indeed he is the cause of it whenever grace is annihilated; he alone can annihilate something, and especially something that he himself immediately preserves. So, just as by refraining from action (that is by not preserving grace) he can be the cause of the non-being of grace, so he can by not acting be the cause of the lack of rightness in an elicited act.

139. Against the third reason [n.133]: it seems to have as conclusion that man cannot sin, and this result is false; therefore the reason is not conclusive.

140. Proof that the result does follow from the reason: I am able to sin at [time] a; therefore God can will me not to be right at a. For this follows in the case of non-modal propositions: ‘if I sin at a, then God does not will me to be right at a’, because from the opposite the opposite follows: ‘if he wills me to be right at a, I am right at a’ and so I do not sin; but if he does not will me to be right at a, he does not will me to will at a what he wills me to will at a (for this, according to the reason [n.133], is what it is to be right, ‘to will what God wills me to will’); therefore God is able not to will me to will at a what he wills me to will at a - which is impossible.

140. But if it be said that the reason [n.133] concludes that God, by ordained power [as opposed to absolute power], cannot take away rightness from the will without an act of the willa - on the contrary: this reason does show absolutely that the result of the reason is that my will cannot sin; in like manner, if the reason were to prove that [God can take away rightness] without an act of my will, it would prove it about God as to his absolute power. For the conclusion aims to infer a contradiction: hence is added the words ‘nothing is more impossible’ [n.133], or at any rate, if the contradiction does not follow, nothing is as equally impossible; nor is it possible for the absolute power of God either; for God contingently wills anything other than himself, and he contingently preserves it, because he is able not to preserve it.

a. a[Interpolation] Response: Thomas, Bonaventure: a better use of that which second perfection uses is a more perfect good of an angel than is first perfection.

3. Scotus’ own Opinion and Solution of the Objections

142. As to the solution of these objections [nn.134-141] and the solution of the principal question [sc. the fourth, n.20], I say that when two partial causes come together for an effect common to both of them, there can be a defect in the producing of the effect because of a defect of either concurring cause; an example: an act of willing (according to the third opinion of d.25 [not in the Ordinatio; see Lectura 2 d.25 n.69]) requires the coming together of intellect and free will, and there can be a defect in this act from a defect of the will although a defect in knowledge does not precede.

143. So therefore, if an act of willing of a created will require the coming together of the created will and the divine will, there can be a defect in this act of willing from a defect of the former cause; and this because that cause could give rightness to the act, and is bound to give it, and yet does not give it; but the latter cause, although it is not bound to give the rightness, yet it would give it, as far as depends on itself, if the created will cooperated. For, universally, whatever God has given antecedently he would give consequently (as far as depends on himself) provided there were no impediment; but by giving free will, he has antecedently given right acts, which are in the power of the will; and therefore, as far as concerns his own part, he has given rightness to every act of the will - and he would give it consequently to the will if the will itself were, on its own part, to do rightly any elicited act.

144. There is a defect, then, in the effect of the two causes, not because of a defect in the higher cause, but because of one in the lower cause; not because the higher cause causes rightness in fact and the inferior one causes wrongness, but because the higher cause - as far as depends on itself - would cause rightness if the lower cause were, according to its own causality, to cause it. And therefore, the fact that rightness is not caused is because the second cause - as far as belongs to itself - does not cause it.a

a. a[Interpolation] On the contrary: the prior cause is determined first to causing rightness or not. Response: let it be that it is determined to causing rightness when the second cause determines itself to not acting rightly. It is also truly the case that what is necessary [sc. God giving rightness] is sometimes voluntary [sc. the created will choosing not to give rightness].

145. And if objection is made (as it was made [n.93]) about the two instants of nature, that in the first instant God would give rightness to the act - I reply:

I say that the priority that includes, without contradiction, ‘able to exist in the absence of each other’ is not an order in causes as causes cause a common effect but as they cause simultaneously. For just as, when speaking of diverse kinds of cause, the matter does not act as matter prior in time to the efficient cause acting on it (as if a thing could without contradiction have acted as matter and not have been acted on, or conversely), but only prior in nature, that is, the one causes more perfectly before the other causes - so although, in the same kind of cause, ordered diverse causes have an order according to causing more or less perfectly, yet they do not have a priority of nature that would mean ‘being able to be in the absence of the other’ in respect of some third thing; rather, just as the matter acts as matter and the efficient cause acts on it in one instant of nature, so two ordered efficient causes cause the common effect in one instant of nature, so that neither then causes without the other. But that a non-right effect is caused, this is not then because of the prior cause (which, as far as depends on itself, would cause rightly if the second would), but because of a defect of the second cause, which has it in its power to cause or not to cause along with the first cause - and if it does not cause along with the first cause the way it is bound to do, there is no rectitude in the effect common to both of them.

146. From this comes response to the objections.

To the first [n.134] that not only is the wise man wise because he is bound by the precept not to destroy his neighbor, and so he cannot be one to make his neighbor worse, but from the wise man’s perfection it also follows that, while he remains wise, he cannot be the first reason for his neighbor falling, and to this extent Augustine’s reason [n.131] does hold; for God is “more excelling than any efficient cause” - that is, his will is simply more perfect, because it is not the first reason for the failing of anyone whom it can act along with.

147. To the second [n.136] the reply is that although God does not necessarily cause the entity belonging to this act, yet he has so disposed things that, whatever he gave antecedently, he gives consequently - as far as concerns his own part [n.136].

148. But then a doubt arises about the principal question. For although the point is saved that sin is not ascribed to God as cause but to the created will [nn.142-145], yet it is not shown that God cannot be the first cause of the failing of the created will; for from the fact that he causes rightness freely and prior to the created will doing so, it seems still to be the case that he could first fail to cause rightness before the created will fails to cause it [nn.91, 135] - and thus he can be the first reason for failure, although this is not because of that law of his which God gave (‘whatever he gave antecedently he gives consequently’) [n.147].

149. I reply. That God cannot in himself sin is plain from the fact that neither can he be turned away from himself formally, because he cannot fail to love himself supremely and in ordered way and with all the required circumstances (otherwise either he could love himself in disordered way or he could change, both of which are impossible); nor even can he be turned virtually from himself, because nothing other than himself is a necessary thing for him to love [n.147]; for anything other than himself, because it is willed by him and willed thus (as for this time, and from this, and so), is willed in ordered way.

150. But why cannot God be the first reason for failing in a created will?

I reply: if God freely does not cause the rightness that should exist in the act of a created will - and this because of his own will’s freedom and not because of a defect in the created will not voluntarily cooperating - then there is no cause of sin in the created will, because there is no lack of due justice; for justice is not due from the created will save insofar as this will has the power to act rightly, such that no removal is presupposed of a prior cause, whose removal would make the will not able to act rightly. If God then were the first cause not making rightness, the non-right act would not be sin.

151. To the other objection, about punishment [n.137], the answer will be plain in the third [nn.185-88] of these four questions [nn.1, 10, 15, 20].

152. To the next objection [n.138], about grace, the answer is plain from what has been said [n.150], because if God, by immediately withdrawing his support, were to annihilate grace without a defect by the will in its operating, the lack of grace would not be a sin, because it would not be a lack of due justice; for the will is not debtor for the justice save as the will has it in its power to preserve justice, namely so as not to corrupt it by demerit. So, although privation of grace is a greater evil than privation of actual justice, yet the privation of grace can come from God’s not acting, that is, from his not preserving it - but not first from his not acting, but from his not acting for this reason, that the will demerited, and because of this demeriting God removes the maintenance of his preservation from the grace; however, as to the actual rectitude, if there is a first sin, there is no sin or demerit preceding it whereby God could withdraw himself so that the rectitude, as far as concerns God’s part, is not present. Therefore, the privation of grace is now a sin insofar as it is a privation of due justice, which the will has deprived itself of by demerit, although the annihilation of the grace is from God’s not causing grace; but if the privation of grace were not because of some prior wrongness in the will, it would not be sin.

153. As to the objection to the reasoning of Anselm [nn.139-40], it could be said that the reasoning does not involve a contradiction, because it equivocates over the term ‘willing’ - for ‘being right’ includes the will’s willing what God wills it to will [n.140]; so God wills with signifying will and antecedently, not with well-pleased will and consequently - because at the instant at which the created will sins, God does not, by consequent will or will of being well pleased, will the created will to will this. So when the inference is drawn that God ‘does not will me to will what he wills me to will’ [n.140], there is no contradiction, because will of being well pleased and consequently is denied but signifying will and antecedently is affirmed; for otherwise (as was argued) it does absolutely seem that the created will could not sin, which is false, and that God cannot by his absolute power take away rightness without demerit of the will, and thus that he cannot by his absolute power make rightness without merit of the created will, both of which are false.

154. However it is possible, by expounding Anselm’s argument there [n.139], to say that his reason proves that God cannot by a positive act take rightness away from the will, because then he would take it away willingly, and so he willingly wills, by will of being well pleased, that I do not will what, by antecedent will, he wills that I will; but this result, although it does not involve a contradiction, is nevertheless false: whatever he wills by antecedent will he wills also by will of being well pleased and consequently (as far as concerns himself), provided no impediment in the created will is put in the way [n.143]. But if rightness is removed without act of mine then I am not putting any impediment in the way; so, in the case posited, God’s ‘willing by will of being well pleased that I do not will what he wills by antecedent will that I will’ is false, even though it does not include a contradiction; and then Anselm’s reason proves no more than that without demerit of the created will God cannot by his ordained power take rightness away from the will [n.141]; but it does not prove this of God’s absolute power - nor even does it prove that God cannot take rightness away negatively, and that because of the demerit of the created will.

C. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

155. To the principal arguments of the first question [nn.2-8].

The savior [n.2] understands by ‘tree’ the internal act and by ‘fruit’ the external act, and he rebukes the hypocrites (that is, the Pharisees) by warning them to conform internal acts to external ones and external acts to internal ones, namely so that they may appear as they are and conversely.

156. To the second [n.3]: when there is an efficient cause, there is a likeness in the case of equivocal causes - though a remote one. Here the cause [sc. the will] with respect to sin is a deficient and not an efficient cause.

157. To the next [n.4]This reply is placed after n.161 in the mss., following the parallel positioning in the Lectura and not the changed position in the Ordinatio. Further, the fourth argument in the Ordinatio [n.5] is not here responded to, and neither it nor its response is found in the Lectura. ⁴⁷ I say that what comes from the deficiency and not from the efficiency of an efficient cause is not directed to a due end.

158. To the next [n.6] I say that no evil is from evil.

159. As to the proof [sc. that there is some first evil, n.8], I say that ‘evil’ can be understood in one way through privation of parts of the same nature, and in another way through privation of perfections that befit such a nature.

160. In the first way there is an infinite regress in the case of parts of the same proportion according as the infinite is divided into the infinite by proportion and quantity; for in this way one part after another could be taken away from some nature and could be thus taken away continually according to parts of the same proportion - and so infinitely; but according to parts of the same quantity there is a stop, not at evil but at nothing - in the way in which there is a stop in the division of the continuous at nothing, if the divided parts are destroyed.

161. As to the second way, I say that although the thing that is good for someone (whose lack is an evil for him) could be taken away from the substrate nature in two ways according to what has been said [n.160] (namely according to parts either of the same proportion, and thus the process goes on infinitely, or of the same quantity, and thus it stops when there is nothing left), yet there is a further process there [sc. the second, n.159], according to which a perfectible nature can be better and the perfection corresponding to it is better and yet the nature lacks this perfection. And in this way there is a stand at evil, when a supreme good lacks the supreme perfection proper to it; and in this way the supreme devil (or some noblest makeable nature that lacks the perfection proportionate to it) is said to be supremely evil; but there are beside such supreme evil no evils positively, nor evils beside something positive, nor privation beside privation.

D. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

1. To the Arguments of the First Part

162. To the arguments of the fourth question [nn.21-28].

I say [n.21] that although sin is from the created will, yet it is not from God; for God does not fail first but, as far as concerns his own part, he altogether does not fail, and there is only a defect in the action because of a defecting in the acting of the second cause [nn.44, 145]. Nor even can God fail first such that his defect in the effect is a sin, because, if he himself did not first act, the lack of rightness in the act would not be a debt [n.150].

163. When proof is given about the inferior and superior cause [n.21], I reply that this is true of an efficient cause but not of a deficient cause.

164. When confirmation is given from other things, as from natural causes [n.22], I say that natural causes cannot cause save in accord with the inclination they have received from the higher cause and that they are conformed to; but the will has received freedom so as to be able to act in agreement or disagreement with the higher cause, that is, that - as far as concerns itself - it may cause what the superior cause causes, agreeing or disagreeing with it.

165. As to the second argument [n.23], I concede the antecedent [nn.23-25] and deny the consequence.

166. As to the proof of the consequence [n.26], the response is that sin is imputed to the created will, not merely for the reason that it per accidens causes the defect, but because it is bound (to the extent the act is under its power) to act rightly, and it does not act rightly. The divine will is not bound in this way, and so in itself it cannot sin [n.149]; nor can it even by not causing be first to fail in respect of the rightness due in the act, such that the rightness would then become due when it is not present because of the defect of the created will.

2. To the Arguments of the Second Part

167. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.30-32], which prove that the act substrate to sin is not from God, I reply:

To the first [n.30] I say that God wills many things by well-pleased will that he has prohibited by signifying will, and that he did not will all the things to be done that he prescribed, as he did not will Isaac to be sacrificed, and yet he prescribed it [Genesis 22.2, 12]. Nor did he prescribe the opposite when willing something by well-pleased will, because this is a sign of a duplicitous will - and it is simplicity when there is some end of the precept consonant to right reason, as the announcement was of the precept there to Abram, as is clear: “God tempted Abram” [Genesis 22.1-2, 16-18].

168. To the next [n.31] I say that what is formally an act of my will (namely an act by which my will wills) is not an act of the divine will but an effect of it, because the divine will is always ordered and its act always right - and the act of my will is disordered because it lacks the rightness due, but it is willed by God in ordered fashion as he is cause, being material with respect to his causing the way that in us our act is materially good; therefore it follows that the divine act of willing is simply perfect, because it is elicited by charity and has the best end; and thus the external work of the divine willing (which work is my act of willing) is ordered materially or in a certain respect, but disordered simply, to the extent it is the act by which my will simply wills.

169. To the last argument [n.32] I say that the divine will is not the rule of the created will in respect of rightness as to the thing willed (so that the will, when agreeing with the divine will and in the thing willed, would be right), but the divine will needs to be the rule for the created will to the extent it wills the created will to will thus and so -and that too when the divine will is willing with signifying and antecedent will, not with well-pleased and consequent will.

III. To the Third Question

A. Solution

170. To the question third in order [n.15] I say that every sin is a punishment, and that one sin can be the punishment of another.

171. [Every sin is a punishment] - First I prove, because punishment is formally the lack of a good suiting the will, that, if in the will we distinguish affection for the just and affection for the good of advantage [d.6 n.40; Anselm On Concord 3.11], it is plain that the taking away of the good of advantage is a punishment; but the good of justice more suits the will than the good of advantage; therefore the taking away of it is per se a punishment.

172. Proof of the minor:

The more perfect something perfectible is, and consequently the more perfect the perfection corresponding to it is, the greater is the fittingness of them and the worse the privation of them; but the will as it has the affection for justice (that is, as it is free, speaking of innate justice) is simply nobler than the will as it has the affection for advantage - and this belongs to it simply; therefore there is a greater suitability of justice to the will absolutely than of the good of advantage to the will. Therefore the taking away of justice is a punishment simply, and a greater punishment than the taking away of any advantage whatever that is different from justice.

173. And herein is well verified what Augustine says in Confessions 1.12 n.19, “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered spirit should be for itself its own punishment;” [Free Choice of the Will 3.15 nn.152-53] “for not even for a moment is the disgrace of guilt without the grace of justice,” namely that the will itself -by depriving itself of justice - does in this deprive itself of the greatest good suitable to it, the lack of which is for it formally a greater punishment than the lack of any good of advantage that is inflicted on it because of the guilt. And hence it is that punishment is said ‘to bring order to guilt’, because, from when God does not will to take the guilt away, the guilty soul cannot be in better or more ordered condition than to be in punishment -which punishment is not as great an evil formally as is the guilt, because it brings order to the nature that remains in guilt.Augustine, On the Nature of Good ch.7, “Therefore are sinners brought to order when undergoing punishment; which order is a punishment for the reason that it does not suit their nature, but is justice for the reason that it suits their guilt;” ch.9, “Nature is in better order when it suffers justly in punishment than when it rejoices without punishment in sin.” ⁴⁸

174. And if the objection is made as to how the same lack of justice can be formally guilt and formally punishment, the Master responds by distinguishing ‘lack’ as it is a privation of good actively or passively; in the first way it is guilt and in the second punishment.

175. This can be explained as follows, that guilt is from the will as will is the active cause, though however a deficient one, and punishment is in the will as will is the subject that is by guilt deprived of the fitting good - and this good was indeed due to the extent that the will according to its primary idea [sc. freedom] could have acted for the rectitude due to it and did not.

176. Guilt exists in the first way [n.175] and is thus voluntary, because it is in the power of the will as in the active cause - just as the prow is said to be in the power of the sailor whereby he could preserve the ship if, when present, he were to work diligently.

177. Punishment exists formally in the second way [n.175], because it is the corruption or privation in the will of the good that is due and most suited for it; and as such it is not formally voluntary [n.17], because the will - as it is subject - does not have the form inhering within it in its power. And this privation of due justice, inhering in the will, is more contrary to the natural inclination of the will than any lack of a non-just advantageous good or than the presence of something disadvantageous.

178. [Whether sin can be the punishment for another sin] - Second I prove [n.171] that, just as the taking away of grace is a punishment for sin (in that, as soon as a defect exists in a will failing to act for due rectitude, God removes his sustaining hand because of the demerit of this defect so that grace is not preserved [n.152]), thus too can God, because of the demerit of one defect of the will, remove himself from it so that in a second act the will does not act for the rectitude that it would act for if no demerit had preceded; and so, because of this removing of himself by God, there will be a lack of rectitude in the second act and this rectitude will still be due, because although giving this rectitude to the act is not now in the will’s power - for it has deprived itself of the divine assistance whereby God was ready to cooperate in rectitude with it - yet it was in the will’s power to give it before (prior to the first sin); and therefore is this failure imputed to the will as sin, just as is also imputed to it that it does not act with grace in the second act after it has lost grace; because, although the will does not then have grace, nor can it then by itself possess grace, yet it has by itself fallen into this powerlessness; for it could have kept grace, and the ability to keep grace was - for this purpose - given to it.

179. But this way [of explaining things] is, as it seems, very difficult, namely that the lack of rectitude in some elicited act could be on the part of God not causing it (that is, his not giving it because of the demerit of some sin); for then, although the will was able before not to demerit (and God would then have assisted it), and although God - as far as his own part is concerned - would have acted for rectitude in the will’s second act if the will had not turned aside in its first act, yet when once the will has sinned, it seems that, if God does not in the second act assist in causing a right act of the will, the sin is not then in the power of the will such that the will would then be able not to be defective; and this seems unacceptable.

180. So one can say in a different way [sc. different from n.178] that, although God - as far as concerns himself - does assist the will in the second act as he also did in the first, and although in any act the first deficient cause (that is, the first cause not acting justly or rightly) is the created will, yet the second defect is a punishment for the first sin insofar as the will deprives itself of the good most suited to it.

181. Nor is there a likeness in the second act between privation of grace and privation of rectitude, because, namely, just as God, on account of the demerit, does not assist in causing grace in the soul, so he does not assist either in causing rightness in the will - for he himself did not give grace antecedently, as he did give rectitude antecedently, and so he is able not to give rectitude consequently.

182. Also, the lack of grace is a single injustice habitual in the soul, not through sin after sin. But in the case of evil acts succeeding each other there is always a new evil, and so there is a need in their case that they all be in the power of the created will; however there is no need that the lack of grace - once grace has been annihilated - be in the power of the will, because this lack is not a new injustice but only a single habitual malice residing in the soul.

B. To the Principal Arguments

183. However, the first argument to the question [n.16] contains the difficulty how sin is a punishment, since every punishment is from God.

184. One response [Bonaventure] is that although what punishment is is not always from God, yet, insofar as punishment brings order to guilt, it is in this way from God, because the order itself is from God.

185. On the contrary: if punishment is not some being that can be from God, then neither is guilt; therefore neither is the relation founded on either extreme from God, and so there is no order there that can be from God.

186. Further, by parity of reasoning guilt could be from God and be an effect of God; for guilt is set in order by punishment as punishment is set in order by guilt, and yet no one allows that punishment is nothing.

187. Therefore one can give a different response [from that in n.184], that a punishment is merely the lack of a good suited to an intellectual nature, just as also is the lack of the vision and enjoyment of God; punishment can in another sense be said to be something positive and yet something unsuited to such a nature, just as excessive heat is something positive and yet is unsuited to flesh.

188. All punishments can in this second sense [n.187] be posited as from God, because they are something positive. And it is about these that the citation from Retractions 1.26 [n.16] must be understood; for it says “among the good works of God,” and good works are those positive things, although they are bad for the punished because they are disagreeable to them.

189. But punishments in the first way [n.187] are not from God as efficient cause (for they cannot have efficient causes), nor from him as deficient cause first but only because of a defect of the created will in some act of sin, God’s will not now acting along with the created will so that it have the good which, as far as depends on himself, he would have cooperated with it for. Such punishment therefore is from God, not by inflicting or effecting it, nor by being first deficient, but by desertion - that is, by deserting the nature that is deficient and leaving it in its defect and in everything consequent to the defect, wherein are included many lackings of perfections suited to such a nature. So the punishment, therefore, that is sin is not from God as efficient cause or as first deficient, but only from him as deserting the will by reason of the will’s first demerit, and the will - deserted by God - falls into a second demerit.

190. To the third argument [n.18; the second argument, n.17, has no response in the Ordinatio] the answer is plain from the same point, that if punishment were inflicted by God it would not be a greater evil but a lesser one - so that the second sin is a punishment that is inflicted by the will sinning and by God only as by his deserting the will.